From Common Market to European Union: The New Europe\u27s Place in the Trading World by Carl, Mogens Peter
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 26, Issue 1 2002 Article 3
From Common Market to European Union:
The New Europe’s Place in the Trading World
Mogens Peter Carl∗
∗
Copyright c©2002 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
From Common Market to European Union:
The New Europe’s Place in the Trading World
Mogens Peter Carl
Abstract
What are the philosophical, political, legal and institutional bases for Europe’s economic re-
lations with the rest of the world? How have they developed over time, as Europe has moved from
the narrow, sectoral basis of the recently defunct European Coal and Steel Community (“ECSC”),
to the radical innovation of the European Economic Community (“EEC”), which itself has become
part of the wider, politically even more ambitious integrationist structure of the European Union
(“EU”), now itself on the verge of a radical expansion of its size? Does today’s EU have as much
or less in common with the ECSC as a fifty-year-old adult has with the gangling teenager that he
once was? This is not a compendium or even semi-exhaustive description of the vast topic called
“the EU’s external economic relations,” nor is it an attempt to claim that it is “better” or more open
than those adopted by other major trading Nations (although I will gladly stake out such a claim in
other contexts). Having gratefully received an invitation to write this Essay, I have instead chosen
to explore a number of key themes, which are part of my daily preoccupations as a practitioner of
EU trade policy.
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INTRODUCTION
What are the philosophical, political, legal and institutional
bases for Europe's economic relations with the rest of the world?
How have they developed over time, as Europe has moved from
the narrow, sectoral basis of the recently defunct European Coal
and Steel Community ("ECSC")', to the radical innovation of
the European Economic Community ("EEC") 2 , which itself has
become part of the wider, politically even more ambitious inte-
grationist structure of the European Union ("EU")3 , now itself
* M.P. Carl has been Director General for Trade in the European Commission
since June 2000. He has written this Essay in a personal capacity and its contents do not
necessarily reflect the official policy of the European Union. Mr. Carl has held a succes-
sion of senior management posts in the European Union Commission. He has also
worked as a senior economist for the World Bank. He holds an M.A. from the Univer-
sity of Cambridge and an M.B.A. from INSEAD.
1. See Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty] (providing for restructuring and rationali-
zation of the coal and steel industries). The ECSC had a term of fifty years. This term
expired on July 24, 2002; see also O.J. C 190/1 (1999) (explaining that European Coun-
cil decided not to renew Treaty, but to absorb these two sectors into sphere of Euro-
pean Community).
2. See Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. 224/1
(1992),[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. 719
[hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [here-
inafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, Oj. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]. The Treaty establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty") was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related
acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. These
amendments were incorporated into the EC Treaty, and the articles of the EC Treaty
were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, O.J. C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty],
incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra. The European Economic
Community, renamed as the European Community in 1993, is governed by the terms of
the EC Treaty.
3. See generally TEU, supra n.2, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (stating
that EU, created by Treaty of Maastricht on November 1, 1993, is governed by terms of
TEU). The overall structure of the European Union encompasses not only the Euro-
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on the verge of a radical expansion of its size? Does today's EU
have as much or less in common with the ECSC as a fifty-year-old
adult has with the gangling teenager that he once was?
These themes are worthy of a book and, undoubtedly, a
great many weighty tomes are to be written by future historians
who will be dissecting the perceived reasons for the successes
and failures of this extraordinary, unprecedented historical ex-
periment that is now known as the EU.
This is not a compendium or even semi-exhaustive descrip-
tion of the vast topic called "the EU's external economic rela-
tions," nor is it an attempt to claim that it is "better" or more
open than those adopted by other major trading Nations (al-
though I will gladly stake out such a claim in other contexts).
Having gratefully received an invitation to write this Essay, I have
instead chosen to explore a number of key themes, which are
part of my daily preoccupations as a practitioner of EU trade
policy.
I. FROM "FORTRESS EUROPE" TO "GLOBALIZATION"?
Why the quotation marks? Because the clich6 "Fortress Eu-
rope"4 was never more than a vague collection of attempts at
temporarily reducing the impact on the more mature part of Eu-
ropean industry of rapidly rising competitors, at a time when the
post-war economic "miracles", especially in EEC-6, had petered
out and were being replaced by post-oil shock strains and imbal-
ances. Nevertheless, it is true that the attitudes of policy makers
varied widely, with the Southern part of Europe being then more
averse to change than the North (with a striking role reversal
having taken place in many respects since then). We were reluc-
tant back then to engage in new "foreign ventures", surmount-
ing with difficulty our internal dissensions to participate in the
launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986.'
pean Community, but also the so-called "second and third pillars": the Common For-
eign and Security Policy and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs.
4. "Fortress Europe" was a term frequently employed in the late 1980s in the
United States and elsewhere to express the concern that the European Community's
internal market program, described infra n.7, might lead, to barriers to external trade
investment. This concern largely disappeared in the 1990s.
5. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTivITIES OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 1996, at 276, par. 703 (1996) (referencing actions of Council in June, October,
November. and December of 1996):
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What, then, is the explanation of why we became enthusias-
tic participants in the conclusion of these negotiations seven years
later, despite the solid doses of liberalization of the last
strongholds of protection that this would (and did) entail? And
why did the EU emerge, only four years after that event with a
blue print to move the World Trade Organization ("WTO" or
the "Organization") even further forward on the path toward
market liberalization and rule making (a blue print largely
adopted at the Fourth Ministerial Conference ("Doha Round")
in November 2001, after four years of incessant effort)?6
One practical, political, and economic reason was the paral-
lel progress of the finalization of the internal European market
and of the Uruguay Round. The negotiation and conclusion of
the Uruguay Round coincided with the virtually complete re-
moval of remaining barriers to internal EU trade ("Single Mar-
ket")7 , in itself much more radical and complete than any Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") or WTO set of
rules.
A more general explanation is the gradual convergence of
public policy attitudes and thinking. Across a wide spectrum of
issues, the Commission and Member State governments now
adopt similar or identical positions on issues of market opening
or closure. They hold comparable views on the importance of
international, or multilateral, rule making versus purely national
approaches. This holds true across the spectrum of industrial
and services trade policy, the main remnants of former diver-
gences being in anti-dumping and, with important nuances, in
agriculture. The mind-sets of European policy makers have
been shaped by the life-size experiment in breaking down intra-
European barriers of all types called the EU and they now tend
6. See World Trade Organization, Doha Development Agenda, available at http://
www.wto.org/index.htm (asserting that in November 2001, Fourth Ministerial Confer-
ence ("Doha Round") was held in Doha, Qatar). The Doha Round established the
Doha Development Agenda ("DDA"), which provides the mandate for negotiations on
a wide range of topics.
7. See Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 (June 1985)
(launching major legislative program to remove inter-Member State barriers to trade
and investment). EC Treaty Article 14 (ex art. 7a), introduced by the SEA on July 1,
1987, set the goal of achieving the Internal Market (after also called the "Single Mar-
ket") by December 31, 1992. For a description, see BERMANN, GOEBEL, DAVEY & Fox,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAw 436-41 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter GOE-
BEL, ET.AL.]
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to approach international cooperation and rule making in the
same spirit. This is not intended as a disingenuous suggestion
that we have all turned into fervent free traders or international-
ists but that Europe is now in the forefront amongst those who
see more and better international negotiation and rule-making
as (possible) solutions and not as many, in some other devel-
oped or developing countries, as a problem and a challenge to
their national sovereignty.
This is the real background to the otherwise one-dimen-
sional debate about "multilateralism" and its perceived virtues or
lack thereof: in Europe we have learned both, a frightening les-
son twice in the past century of the consequences of purely na-
tional/nationalistic approaches, and the positive lesson of doing
the opposite over nearly two generations of decision-makers.
Few other countries have had the opportunity to learn the posi-
tive lesson, nor do they seem to have drawn all the conclusions
from the negative lesson, including in particular the United
States, the only other world economy of comparable size, power,
and influence.
Curiously, we have moved within the space of fifteen years
from the clich6 of "Fortress Europe" to vociferous complaints
from our partners in third-world countries (and part of our own
populations) that we want to go too far and too fast (vide the
controversy surrounding the launch of the new WTO Round of
negotiations at Doha)', or perhaps the clich6 was not really true
in the first place? As to the lobbying efforts by European compa-
nies in Brussels on international trade matters, they are virtually
exclusively focused on their requests on market opening, most
often in other countries but sometimes also in the EU itself, and
only very rarely on market closure at home.
There is, however, also in Europe greater wariness than else-
where of what are here perceived as the simple or even simplistic
notions that the WTO should focus on its classical task of market
opening to the exclusion of other objectives. If globalization, in
a strict economic sense of the term, is to be a success, it cannot
be left only to the proverbially blind market forces that no coun-
try hesitates to tinker with in its own territory. International rule
making must accommodate man's non-economic aspirations.
Even to those only intent on the economic side of the equation,
8. See Doha Development Agenda, supra n.6.
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it should be obvious that simply lowering tariffs or other obvious
barriers to trade is like the story of the Dutch child plugging the
holes in the dike with his fingers only to see other holes opening
up and flooding the land. There is no dichotomy between mar-
ket opening and better rules; the two go together. Nor is the
question whether these rules should be one-dimensional or
whether they should cover wider issues'. Virtually all key WTO
rules are already today multi-dimensional, directly or by infer-
ence. Rather, the real question is whether the WTO reached
perfection when its 558 pages of agreements entered into force
in 199510 or whether important improvements should still be
sought. My own answer is an emphatic "yes" to the latter, but
more on this later.
II. FROM EU FIFTEEN TO EU TWENTY-SOMETHING
It is an interesting paradox that this evolution of thinking
and attitudes in Europe has been developing despite the ever-
growing "continental" size of our economy. The classical, and
admittedly oversimplified, measure is the share of international
trade in Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") which for the EU is
now slightly below that of the United States and Japan (and the
current data are even somewhat exaggerated by the inclusion of
our immediate neighbors in Norway and Switzerland in the
figures on "foreign" trade). As often, however, aggregates tend
to obscure equally important exceptions or qualifications. We
need international trade more than these figures suggest, partly
for old-fashioned reasons such as a lack of energy products or
raw materials, but also because foreign investment and trade in
goods, services, and intellectual property is an essential way of
transmitting and receiving new technology and ideas. "Free(r)
trade" is, for many of us, more a deliberate "choice of society"
than a choice based on any hard-nosed mercantilist calculation.
Will these attitudes change as we move from EU Fifteen to
EU Twenty-something (the reader will forgive me for the coy
"Twenty-something" - as this Essay is being drafted, the en-
largement negotiations are still not finished)." The enlarged
9. For example, consumer or environmental protection.
10. See World Trade Organization, Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT 1994 [hereinafter
Marrakesh Protocol] (Apr. 15, 1994), available at http://www.wto.org/index.htm.
11. See European Commission, Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Europe, E.U.
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Community's dependence on the outside world will drop even
further. What certainly will intensify will be the dampening of
any significant effect on our economies of booms or busts in the
non-European economies (compounded with the adoption of
the Euro as the single currency for most current Member
States).12 On the other side of the equation, the corollary will be
an even greater relative dependence on the enlarged EU market
of a great number of developing countries for which trade with
the EU already today represents the difference between growth
and stagnation or depression, hence creating an ever greater re-
sponsibility for the EU, especially towards the more vulnerable
economies.
Will the accession of new Members to the EU change the
attitudes represented today in the Commission or around the
table in the Council of Ministers on the type of issues that are
the subject of this Essay? On average, probably not. Most of the
countries mooted for early membership recently went through
severe trials of foreign domination and suffered the privations
engendered by deeply flawed centralized economic systems.
With inevitable qualifications and nuances (likely in agriculture
for some of them), one may expect them to support, perhaps
enthusiastically, the movement towards international market
opening and rule making traced by the present EU. The main
challenge for us here in Brussels will be to manage the transition
from EU Fifteen to EU Twenty-something in terms of our deci-
sion-making process, and to do this most likely at the same time
that we will be engaged in the final stretch of the Doha Round
negotiations.
III. THE ROLE OF THE WTO IN THE EU'S EXTERNAL
TRADE POLICY'
Over the years, in a haphazard way that future historians will
attribute to a grand master plan, the EU has established a dense
network of trade agreements with third-world countries, includ-
BULL., no. 7/8 (1997). This document led to the ultimate applications from Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia. See generally Eneko Landaburu, 26 FORDHAM INr'L L.J. 1 (2002) (discuss-
ing enlargement of EU).
12. See generally GOEBEL ET AL., supra n.7 at ch.33F (stating that on January 1, 2002,
Euro became single currency for all Member States except Denmark, Sweden, and
United Kingdom).
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ing the seventy-seven Members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States ("ACP") 13; virtually all countries around
the Mediterranean, Eastern and Central Europe (in anticipation
of their accession to the EU) 14 ; and a few countries beyond the
immediate geographical ambit of Europe (Chile, Mexico, and
South Africa)." More are being prepared, with Mercosur16 and
the Gulf Cooperation Council ("GCC"). 17
Today, the EU's trade is divided into three roughly equal
thirds between trade with countries with which it has preferen-
tial agreements; imports where its duties have been reduced to
zero in successive WTO negotiations; and the rest (and to illus-
trate one of the limitations of this kind of comparison of "the
rest", the United States represents about thirty percent, but a
sizeable part of EU imports from the United States of agricul-
tural and other products already now are imported at zero duty).
The underlying motivations have largely been "political", in the
widest sense of the term, with attempts to open foreign markets
to EU products generally coming in second or third place, the
main exceptions being the agreements concluded over the past
few years with Chile, Mexico, and South Africa, the so-called "Eu-
rope agreements" with accession candidates, and the customs
union with Turkey, which all contain strong elements of recipro-
cal market opening.
What should be the role of the WTO? Is it necessary to
make a choice between further multilateral market opening and
rule making through the WTO, on the one hand, and continued
13. See African, Carribbean, and Pacific Group of States, Cotonou Agreement (2000),
available at www.apsec.org/gb.
14. See Euro-Meditteranean Partnership, Barcelona Declaration, available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/external-relations (1995); see also GOEBEL, ET AL., supra n.7, at
ch.28 (explaining that Europe Agreements, requiring preferential trade and investment
terms, are in effect since mid-1990s with all Central European Nations currently apply-
ing for accession). Id. at 1065-69. Other preferential association agreements are in
force with virtually all the Nations in the Mediterranean basin, and more are being
strengthened in new accords by virtue of the Barcelona Partnership Declaration of the
European Council in 1995. Id. at 1069.
15. See GOEBEL, ET AL., supra n.7, at 1071-72.
16. See European Union, The EU's Relations with Mercosur, available at http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/external relations/index.htm (explaining that Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay created Mercosur in March 1991 with goal of creating common
market between participating countries).
17. See id. (noting that Gulf Corporation Council ("GCC") was created in 1981).
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates created the
Gulf Cooperation Council ("GCC") in May 1981. Id.
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free trade agreement ventures on the other hand, or can they
coexist? My answer to the latter is "yes."
Firstly, one should not see the two approaches as being mu-
tually exclusive. However far you go in terms of removing trade
barriers through free trade agreements, it will still be essential to
have the WTO rule book on horizontal issues, essentially cover-
ing various aspects of governmental rule making that do not
lend themselves easily to bilateral agreements and which are
often as significant barriers to trade as are tariffs.
Secondly, if or when further progress in the WTO is to be
hampered by continued resistance from those Members who
prefer to slow down international market opening, the conclu-
sion of free trade agreements among others may become the
only viable option.
Thirdly, there are and will be countries which, even if the
Doha Round does make significant progress on market access
and other issues, will be willing to go further and faster towards
deeper integration (inevitably, in the jargon, referred to as
"WTO plus").
Nonetheless, the WTO should, for wider political reasons, re-
main the mainstay of international rulemaking: this is the forum
where smaller and weaker Members have a chance to protect
their interests through collective action, albeit in various con-
figurations, a theme which was prevalent through the Uruguay
Round but which has lost its intensity, indeed virtually disap-
peared, from public discourse, even in these "small and weaker
Members" and now sometimes replaced by the brand of "WTO
skepticism" proffered by those who prefer the world to stand still
because they are oh-so-cozy behind their current preferential
schemes or protectionist walls.
IV. BACK TO BASICS
Arguably, the world trading system needs to be revised. The
main rulebook, i.e., the WTO agreements, runs to 558 pages,
drafted between ten and fifty-odd years ago. Its main defects, as
defined by one or the other Member, turn around the funda-
mental questions of predictability and fairness (and the two
often connect, as we shall see below).
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A. Predictability
"Predictability" in this context is meant to describe the ex-
tent to which a trader can expect that he will be able to sell his
product (all "private" aspects of the contract being abstracted
from) without the government of the importing country shifting
the goal posts in a manner that the trader could not reasonably
have expected. With the ever-increasing importance of govern-
ment regulation in all countries regarding safety, consumer and
environmental protection, etc., the risk of seeing your invest-
ment wasted or your efforts nullified grows unless the interna-
tional rule book (mostly that of the WTO) allows you to calcu-
late the risk and to take action to reduce its impact on your activ-
ities. But there is a built-in barrier to this search for greater
predictability which is the survival of the Westphalian system
where legitimacy and power are vested with sovereign States,
however qualified by post-World War II international rule mak-
ing, which puts a damper on the enthusiasm of any country to
reduce its scope for national decision-making on issues seen as
essential by its own citizens.
Another side of the "predictability" coin has to do with the
basic issue of market opening. The W/TO rulebook contains
rather precise obligations on market opening 8 and this, in turn,
carries with it the risk that important parts of a national eco-
nomic fabric may suddenly be wiped out by foreign competition.
Therefore, the Members of the WTO have agreed on a number
of possible safety valves, essentially of the "safeguard action" vari-
ety.' 9 However, if these are misused for reasons other than their
basic purpose (i.e., to provide relief in genuinely dire straits), as
we have repeatedly seen these past few years, the predictability of
the system takes another hard knock.
In both examples above, the accent is on the search for the
right balance between national sovereignty and international
rule making, and that balance will necessarily change as our soci-
eties change. The problem is that our societies are changing at
different speeds and sometimes in different directions, also in
18. See Marrakesh Agreement supra n.10, art. 3, 4, & 10 (establishing WTO on April
15, 1994).
19. See World Trade Organization, Safeguard Measures, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratope/safege/safege.htm (discussing permissible safeguard
measures available to WTO Members).
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their respective perceptions of the outside world and of their
readiness to share decision-making with others.
More concretely, what should be done, on the assumption
(perhaps erroneous) that other Members of the WTO are also
willing to review the rulebook with the purpose of making our
respective rights and obligations clearer? The very fact that one
needs to ask the question is a paradox. After all, which country
in the world would choose to fix its domestic legislation in con-
crete forever after? But if not, why should the WTO remain as a
1993 time capsule? The areas that need "clarification" abound:
the rules that deal with product standards, in particular, leave
much to be desired, drafted as they are in rather general terms
they have the effect of, alternatively, allowing for protectionist
action with little or no truly defensible purpose or of "chilling"
legitimate national action, especially by the weaker Members of
the Organization. We also need to review and clarify the rela-
tionship between the WTO rules and those international agree-
ments that cover the protection of the environment.
This latter point has been one of the most contentious is-
sues in the context of the launch of the Doha Development
Agenda ("DDA"), needlessly contentious because much of the
debate has been based on facile stereotypes with only passing
resemblance with reality. The issue is now on the negotiating
agenda but the controversy remains. This is not the place to re-
hash the arguments of the opposing sides, but rather, to put a
difficult but simple, although admittedly loaded question: how
can the international community ignore the relationship be-
tween the rules according to which we govern international eco-
nomic relations and those that we establish to protect the global
or local environment? The answer need not be (and probably
will not be) that we need to impose further barriers on trade but
that the international community should have the right to de-
cide what reasonable rules on trade may be required to support
the achievement of internationally recognized environmental
objectives. In order to do so, you need, inter alia, to ensure that
the respective "rulebooks" coincide or, at least, that they do not
contradict each other.
The problem is that the debate on these issues in the WTO
has, ever since the creation of the Organization seven years ago,
been dominated by stereotypes rather than by serious debate.
Curiously, it is those same countries that have been arguing most
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strongly against "green protectionism", e.g., Australia, New Zea-
land, and countries in North and South America, who have, and
by very far, adopted the most restrictive measures against im-
ports of various agricultural products deemed by them to create
a risk for animal or plant life or safety.
The issue of "predictability" is also connected with the ques-
tion of fairness. All "Western" countries are continuously modi-
fying their domestic legislation on very specific aspects of prod-
uct standardization, safety, environmental protection, etc. For
the great majority of small- or medium-sized developing country
exporters, this is understandably the problem of unpredictability,
which creates an even greater concern than that over the
residual tariff protection. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures are
adopted and often kept in place for long periods of time, with
little practical possibility that many exporters will even under-
stand what is being expected from them (not to speak of those
measures which are adopted in some countries for protectionist
reasons behind a thin veneer of consumer protection). And yet,
there is no real push from among the WTO membership to "re-
view" these essential parts of the rule book (in the jargon, espe-
cially the Technical Barriers to Trade20 and the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreements 21), the "reviews" of both being largely
a long drawn out bureaucratic exercise with no substantial focus.
Has the Organization reached the point where its Members' de-
sire to preserve the present degree of national leeway for action
in these areas is stronger than their desire to increase predict-
ability and fairness?
As suggested above, the "safety valves" purposely built into
the system, also need to be brought up to date. The "safeguard"
agreement 22, negotiated in the early 1990s, was, on purpose,
drafted in such a way that it left considerable flexibility (to use a
polite term) for national protective action, and this for the
clearly understood and laudable reason that one wanted back
20. See World Trade Organization, The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tbt-e/tbt-e.htm (explaining
that document was created to standardize technical and product regulations in various
participating countries).
21. See World Trade Organization, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (1994),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/sps-e/sps_e/htm (establishing basic
rules to regulate food safety, animal, and plant health).
22. See World Trade Organization, The Agreement on Safeguards (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/wto/English/tratop-e/safeg-e/safeint.htm.
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then to create an incentive for Members to move away from the
informal type of arm twisting referred to in inimitable GATT and
Orwellian double speak as "voluntary" restraint agreements. We
should have no regrets: the new system is better than (the ab-
sence of one in) the old, but it is still not good enough, as
demonstrated by the recent U.S. decision to put thirty percent
tariffs on imports of steel which had actually decreased. Yet, the
WTO system provides for only limited safeguards against exces-
sive safeguard action, with dispute settlement being a long
drawn-out affair during which the country taking protective ac-
tion gathers "rent" in the economic theory sense of the term. All
Members are potential victims of such action.
In addition to "safeguards", the WTO also allows action
against unfairly priced imports ("anti-dumping"2 ) or against im-
ports that have been subsidized. 24 Here, the experience of the
past seven years is equally disturbing: both (but especially anti-
dumping) are being used as surrogates for genuine safeguard
action, all too often serving as the "safety net" which should only
be supplied by justified safeguard action, with long delayed sanc-
tions for transgression created by the length of dispute settle-
ment procedures. Virtually all major economies are users of
anti-dumping action, and now even many developing countries,
which have taken to this type of action with much enthusiasm.
The reform of the system and the tightening of the rules against
protectionist abuse should be an important objective for the
Doha Round.
B. Fairness
Is the WTO system "fair"? What does "fairness" mean in this
context? How should it be achieved? To me, this is the second
major issue that we need to face in the twenty-first century.
Once more, I will be highly selective in order to focus on a
few key issues. So, to simplify, are the weaker (i.e., smaller and
poorer) Members getting a fair shake? Are they being discrimi-
23. See World Trade Organization, Anti-dumping, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/adpe/adpe.htm (stating that Anti-Dumping Agreement regulates
export of products at lower prices than that charged in home market).
24. See World Trade Organization, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Mea-
sures (1994), available at http://wvw.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tratop-e.htm (address-
ing multilateral disciplines regulating provision of subsidies and use of countervailing
measures to offset injury caused by subsidized imports).
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nated against by a system dominated by the bigger Members?
Can they effectively defend their interests? My politically incor-
rect answer to all three is "generally, yes", hastening to add that
it could, of course, be better.
Until the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, developing
countries received the benefits of successive rounds of tariff re-
ductions without having to contribute themselves. Developing
countries were largely, until then, "free riders", benefiting from
the market opening provided by others, largely without any reci-
procity being asked by the developed countries. Therefore, it
would be exceedingly difficult to argue that they had given more
than they have received - on the contrary. The Uruguay
Round was the big turning point when the industrialized coun-
tries committed themselves to eliminate quotas on textiles and
clothing, and where developing countries, for the first time ever,
were accepted to participate in the tariff negotiations and, most
importantly, partly to "bind" (i.e., legally fix) some of the results
of the negotiations. All Members, in all other respects (with the
exception of the occasional transition period) committed them-
selves to abide by the new rules in all areas, and were made sub-
ject to binding dispute settlement (quo vide, below).
This does not detract from the argument that the system
could and should be fairer. Developed countries can and
should afford a much greater degree of market opening than
they currently do. It is certainly true that obstacles such as tariff
escalation and tariff peaks affect developing country exports dis-
proportionately. It would, however, be a mistake to confuse this
with the argument that no demands should be made to develop-
ing countries in return. Economic development is gained not
only by improved market access abroad, but by opening one's
own market, thus decreasing the "rent" of local oligarchies, and
by adopting international rules and standards, thus creating a
more conducive climate for both local and international invest-
ment.
"Fairness", however, not only has altruistic international as-
pects. Any policy maker has to demonstrate to his constituents
that they, too, are getting a fair deal, whether this is expressed in
economic terms or in terms of social fairness, protection of the
(global) environment, etc. Much of the debate in Europe has
been focused on the former (international) aspect, with a
ground swell of support and pressure from individuals, Parlia-
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ments and non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") in favor
of a "development friendly" EU policy. Others are equally vocal
in stressing the impact of globalization on the weaker members
of society both, in developing and developed countries. This
crystallized in the WTO around the question of "trade and la-
bor" and whether the connection between trade and working
conditions was something worthy of consideration in the WTO.
This has proved to be one of the most divisive issues among the
Members, with further consideration, at least for the time being,
confined to a newly established forum of discussion in the Inter-
national Labor Organization ("ILO").
It would, however, be a mistake to believe that the issue has
gone away. In particular, the question of the exploitation of la-
bor, in general or more specifically child or forced labor, will
continue to return until the international community, and in
particular its individual Members, implement relevant ILO in-
struments and not only pay lip-service to them, as so many coun-
tries do.
V. REFORMING THE WTO SYSTEM
A quiet revolution in international economic relations oc-
curred when the WTO was created and when its "rule book" be-
came enforceable through binding dispute settlement. It can
even be argued that the delayed shock of realizing the implica-
tions of this new system, when all of a sudden it dawned upon
the Members that they would have to abide by their commit-
ments, led to the great opposition in the late 1990s to the EU's
proposals to launch a New Round.
The great novelty of the WTO's "binding" dispute settle-
ment system 25 is that it introduced into international law and
relations the notion that an offended party can be authorized by
a judicial system to take action, which can harm the economic
interests of another Member if the rights of the former under
the system have been harmed. Therefore, although national
governments are under no direct compulsion to change their laws
and regulations if they are found to violate the WTO, the pres-
sure to come into conformity can be compelling when the other
25. See World Trade Organization, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/le-
gal-e/legal-e.htm#dispute.
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party is given the right to apply a sufficiently important level of
"countermeasures."
To invent a domestic example: this is tantamount to a legal
system where, because the absence of police makes it difficult to
collect fines, the winner in a law suit is allowed, within clearly
circumscribed limits, to take action against the losing party's bus-
iness interests.
For those who believe in international cooperation and rule
making, not to speak of freer trade, this is an important positive
achievement, and one should have no regrets that we now do
have a law-based system. Nevertheless, this sense of satisfaction is
now tempered for many by the realization that some of the unin-
tended side effects of the new system may do more harm than
good and that it is one that, paradoxically, potentially favors the
stronger partner.26
Firstly, the system is based on the principle of "an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth." In brief, if country A is found to have
violated country B's rights under the WTO to export to A, B may
adopt retaliatory measures which will restrict A's exports to B by
a similar amount (hence, "an eye for an eye"). The merit of the
system is that it creates a potentially powerful incentive to be vir-
tuous in terms of observing one's obligations under the WTO.
The paradoxical, unintended, and absurd side effect is that this
will lead to a doubling of the loss of trading opportunities (ex-
ports blocked and then imports curtailed) unless the offending
party changes its legislation quickly.
This should be changed and there are credible alternatives.
In particular, instead of putting the emphasis on sanctions (by
definition negative and trade restraining in character), one
should create a system based on a mixture of sticks and carrots
to make Members offer trade compensation by increasing mar-
ket access in other sectors to compensate for the loss of access in
the sector under dispute, pending the outcome of their domes-
tic political battle to modify legislation to comply with the WTO
ruling.
Secondly, the present system is one that indirectly favors
those Members that are large enough to absorb the retaliatory
measures authorized by the WTO. To economies the size of the
EU, Japan, or the United States, the imposition of retaliation to
26. See supra Part IIB. Fairness.
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the tune of a few hundred million will hardly be noticed (except
by the small part of the population affected). To small econo-
mies, developing or developed, this is a different matter. They
will be more vulnerable to attack (although with the size of their
"offense" being presumably correspondingly low, this is not the
main consideration), and more importantly, they will find it
more difficult to enforce their rights if the (developed) country
hit by their retaliatory measures decides to absorb them and
carry on regardless. This problem, in turn, is one where this
built-in (albeit unintended) absence of "fairness" could be re-
paired by a judicious addition of compensation as an obligatory
alternative to sanctions.
Last, but not least, has the system, to paraphrase Peter's
principle, "succeeded to the point that it has made itself immo-
bile"?
While criticized by anti-globalizers from left and right, the
WTO has continued to act as a magnet to new candidates, now
reaching 144 Members. Although thoroughly equipped with an
impressive array of Councils, Committees, Working Groups and
the like, it differs little from its predecessor, the GATT, which
itself was largely a place where Members met to negotiate (and
now also to resolve disputes in a legal forum), assisted by a mod-
estly equipped but high quality secretariat. Abstracting from its
dispute settlement function, the WTO is still largely a forum for
negotiation and international rule making, requiring, for all es-
sential purposes, consensus among its Members.
The question is whether it is realistic and desirable to con-
tinue down this road or whether we should envisage different
approaches. After all, is it reasonable to expect that the same
detailed rules should apply to a country in the direst economic
straits as to a country at the peak of economic development? In
reality, this contradiction has been overcome, partly by a liberal
use of transition periods (but which, by definition, are only stick-
ing plasters on the wound); partly by limited recourse to special
provisions for developing countries (self-elected and defined,
ranging from U.S.$1-a day, least developed countries to Singa-
pore); and partly by developed countries largely closing their
eyes to the persistence of non-compliance.
The basic question is therefore whether we should be ready
to envisage a WTO that would apply different rules to different
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countries, a two- or multi-speed rulebook. The purists are
strongly opposed. Those who fear stagnation and hence, regres-
sion caused by the now unwieldy consensus-based system, have
raised the question, but to howls of protest. Interestingly, those
who protest the loudest are also among the strongest propo-
nents of more "special and differential treatment" of developing
countries. Translated from the usual fog of words, this means
that these countries want to have their say at the negotiating ta-
ble while not necessarily being bound by the outcome.
Next year's Ministerial Conference at Canctin will provide
an essential test when Members will be called on to move to
stage two of the Doha Round negotiations. If they fail, the stage
will be set for another crisis in the Organization, in substance
potentially more important than the debacle of Seattle because
it would endanger the conclusion of the new round.
VI. THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
The agreement reached at the WTO ministerial conference
in November 2001 to launch a new round of trade negotiations,
the DDA,27 was necessary to move the Organization towards the
realization of the two objectives above (predictability and fair-
ness). This is not the place to reiterate the arguments underly-
ing the EU's four-year quest to launch this new mammoth nego-
tiation, which has the potential of surpassing the Uruguay
Round in terms of its substantive contents. Suffice it to recall its
basic objectives (admittedly seen from an EU perspective but
also enshrined in the substance of the negotiating agenda):
* improved market access;
* special attention to developing country interests;
* the broadening of the scope of the WTO to cover, inter alia,
investment and competition;
" the nexus "trade and environment";
" reviewing and improving the dispute settlement system; and
" improving WTO rules.
If successful, these negotiations will turn the WTO into a
truly comprehensive international economic policy forum, with
binding rules and mechanisms for resolving disputes in most ar-
eas touching upon international economic relations, with the
27. See World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review European Union (June 26,
2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/TPR/G02.doc.
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notable exception of monetary and financial issues, which will
remain with the Bretton Woods institutions. The objective is to
update the WTO to the circumstances of the early part of the
century.
Whether we should, in the future, continue to focus on the
launch of such huge enterprises is another question. The reason
in the past has been that this was the only way to ensure that all
participants found issues of importance to them on the agenda,
that the final outcome was one that was politically sellable back
home. Has this "big bang" approach run its course with the
DDA? I am not (yet) convinced. The protracted birth pangs of
the DDA were, indeed, caused by the "big bang" approach of the
EU. If we had agreed to limit future negotiations to a simple
market access round, there is little doubt that we would have
succeeded earlier. The implicit logic of this, however, is that
such an earlier "success" would have been at the expense of all
the other issues, with little if any guarantee that they would ever
see the light of day on any WT negotiating agenda.
The more fundamental question is whether we have, with
the DDA, reached, for a certain time, a plateau in what other
Nations are prepared to undertake by way of international rule
making and hence partial circumscription of their leeway for na-
tional law making. Because of our historical background and ex-
perience of forty-odd years of the same on a much bigger and
more profound scale here in Brussels, the EU may be less reluc-
tant to engage in such future ventures. As suggested at the be-
ginning of this article, few, if any, other major Members have
had the same historical experience.
VII. INSTITUTIONS AND DECISION-MAKING
Trade policy is one of the (regrettably) few areas of interna-
tional relations where the EU speaks with one voice, indeed so
much so that it is being held up in the ongoing constitutional
Convention in Brussels as a model for what could be done in
other respects. Its functioning is surprisingly simple and prag-
matic, based on a generally worded treaty provision 28 and on
28. See Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
art. 133, OJ.C. 340/3 (1997) I.L.M. 79, 108 (ex art. 113) [hereinafter Consolidated EC
Treaty), incorporating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain re-
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many years of accumulated practice.
It is a system that has grown out of Member State institu-
tional practice, with most of the power in the hands of the exec-
utive and only limited power in the hands of the legislature.
This has, mutatis mutandis, been transferred to "Brussels" where
the Commission "consults" a committee of Member State repre-
sentatives2' and then, on this basis, carries out what it considers
to be the policy for which there is sufficient support inside the
EU. On occasion, the Council of Ministers is asked to adopt a
formal decision in terms of legislation or treaty making. The key
element in this structure is the Commission's (nearly) sole right
of initiative, rarely leavened by continued temptations by Mem-
ber States to present their own policy proposals in areas (essen-
tially part of services, intellectual property and investment)
where there is still, what in the jargon is called national "compe-
tence ' 30 (as opposed to the "competence" for initiative and ac-
tion that exclusively resides with the Commission/Community in
all other areas). So the Commission is the central player, as the
initiator and subsequently as the negotiator/interlocutor with
the outside world. What adds spice to this simplified image is, of
course, the continued temptation of (some) Member States to
pursue what they consider to be their national interest by curry-
ing favor with one or the other third country, arguing that they
are (by definition) that country's best friend.
This model is, in one important respect, an anachronism in
lated acts, Oct. 2, 1997, OJ. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] amend-
ing Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC
Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom
Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EU Treaty, which enables the Commis-
sion to negotiate and the Council, acting by a qualified majority vote, to conclude inter-
national agreements binding on the EC and its Member States within the scope of the
Common Commercial Policy.
29. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.28, art. 133, O.J.C. 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at
108 (ex art. 113). The Commission's consultation of the so-called 133 committees of
Member State representatives during international commercial negotiations is required
by Article 133(3).
30. The Court of Justice held in OUI [1994] E.C.R. 5267 that most aspects of ser-
vices, investment, and intellectual property remained in the competence of the Mem-
ber States. The Treaty of Nice's amendment to Article 133 extends the Common Com-
mercial Policy to most of these sectors and thus enables the adoption of decisions on
the basis of qualified majority voting and confirms the Commission's exclusive negotia-
tion role.
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that it leaves little scope for Parliamentary involvement 3' (de-
rived, as suggested above, from a European tradition diametri-
cally opposed to that of the United States, which is further dis-
cussed below). It is difficult to imagine how this can perdure,
especially in an area of political life where the impact on deci-
sions made in areas highly technical and apparently purely eco-
nomic now goes far beyond their immediate subject matter,
touching upon citizens' non-economic objectives and preoc-
cupations, whether they are ethical, social, or related to human
safety or the environment. This has to change, and it will.
From the more narrow perspective of a decision-maker, it is
a system that works and has the virtue of being once or twice
removed from the type of lobbying pressures that hold sway in
other systems such as that of the United States. It is not as if the
density of lobbyists in Brussels has much reason to envy that of
Washington, but decision making is largely in the hands of the
executive branch (Commission, "advised" by Member State gov-
ernment representatives), as opposed to the United States,
where authority for trade policy is vested in Congress and is con-
sequently much more directly exposed to various types of pres-
sures.
Once more, this is not a black and white situation. Obvi-
ously, the opinions of sectoral lobbies matter in Brussels, but it is
a question of degree, or rather of many degrees. And obviously,
the Commission listens ever more intently to the European Par-
liament, the interventions of Oxfam, and the World Wildlife
Fund.
Fifteen years ago, it was rightly said that the United States
found it easy to launch a new international negotiation or initia-
tive but difficult to conclude one, whereas the EU found it diffi-
cult to launch but easy to conclude. This has fundamentally
31. EC Treaty Article 133 makes no reference to Parliament's involvement in ei-
ther the negotiation or conclusion on international agreements. By tradition dating to
1973, under the so-called Luns-AWesterterp procedures, Parliament is kept informed
about important international trade agreement negotiations. Under EC Treaty Article
300 (ex art. 228) (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam), Parliament's assent, by an
affirmative vote of an absolute majority of its Members, is required for such interna-
tional agreements as create international institutional frameworks; have important
budgetary implications; or have the effect of amending internal market legislation that
has been adopted through the co-decision of the Parliament. The Parliament accord-
ingly had to give its assent to the IWTO Agreement in 1993. See generally GOEBEL ET AL.,
supra n.7, at ch.27A2.
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changed: we find it much easier now to launch new initiatives
on the international scene, but this is already beginning to be
counterbalanced by what I expect to be ever-growing difficulties
to conclude unless we find new ways of ensuring that we will not
only be supported by our Member State governments but by our
societies at large.
There are also important implications from the enlarge-
ment to EU Twenty-something, in at least two respects. Firstly,
our present decision making system relies on the possibility of
forcing a vote depending on the type of issue (e.g., anti-dump-
ing), based on a simple majority of Member States or a "quali-
fied" majority where Member States' votes are weighted roughly
according to their population size.3 2 But a number of issues are
still subject to consensus. This is manageable with a group of
fifteen countries whose interests and attitudes have, as suggested
above, substantially converged over time. It will not be managea-
ble with twenty-five Members. We have to extend majority voting
to all areas of trade policy.
Secondly, already today, our well-tried and well-functioning
system of consulting Member States is being forced open at the
seams by changes in attitudes towards governmental decision-
making. Our formerly rather opaque consultative machinery is
increasingly being treated by the participants as a quasi-public
forum from which the public is absent but from which it is being
served the tidbits that serve the interests of those who "leak." We
thus have the disadvantages of a system that has the reputation
of being secretive and opaque without really having one (and
hence often 'miss the possibility of being able to take important
tactical decision in real secrecy), while not having the advantages
of a truly transparent system. The "133 Committee '33 (as it is
called after the relevant Treaty provision) has thus, defacto, be-
come a quasi-public forum.
One may say that this is already the case in the United States
with public hearings and debates in the relevant Congressional
committees, and this is arguably what we miss here. However, it
is true that no government is capable of functioning without a
32. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.28, art. 205, OJ. C 340/3, at 264-65
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 121-22 (ex art. 148) (indicating mechanism for qualified majority
voting in Council and current weighted votes for Member States).
33. See supra n.29.
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reasonable degree of secrecy surrounding certain important de-
cisions (tactical or others). In that respect, in reality, the U.S.
system amply allows for secrecy (which also contributes to mak-
ing it highly unpredictable for outsiders), at variance with its ap-
parent transparency.
This is a real conundrum: how can we move towards an
open forum for discussion, inevitable with Twenty-something
Member States, and still preserve a capacity for setting strategy
and tactics? Should the European Parliament provide this pub-
lic forum and, if so, what should be the role of Member States
and the Council (on the assumption, safe, I hope, that the Com-
mission would retain its central role as initiator and external rep-
resentative)? And how do we foster genuine "transparency" (as
opposed to the mainly formalistic, superficially pleasing varieties
that consist in supplying vast amounts of information without
there being a real opportunity for debate on the fundamental
choices, where one loses sight of the forest for the trees)?
CONCLUSION
The EU has not become a "melting pot" of people but it has
become a crucible of ideas. It is unanimous in trying to influ-
ence the outside world, largely through "multilateral" negotia-
tion and diplomacy, less through traditional power projection.
It has learned some hard lessons of history. It will face the grow-
ing pangs of expanding, most likely at a prodigious pace within a
short period of time, but those who will join us will have gone
through a recent historical experience, which should make them
support many of our current policies and approaches, even if
their income per head is most often comparable to that of a mid-
ranking developing country. Our decision-making machinery
will be subject to a necessary overhaul, the outcome of which is
too early to predict.
What I will predict is a continued strong European prefer-
ence to continue to project our foreign economic objectives and
policies internationally through the WTO. The main question is
whether Members of the WTO have the same preference or
whether the Organization is reaching the limits of what other
Members are willing to accept in terms of international con-
straints on their sovereignty. The outcome of the Doha Round
will provide the answer.
